Because of the large size of non-traded human capital, causing some idiosyncratic risks not to be traded, …nancial markets in the real world are massively incomplete. We develop a method that allows one to compute incomplete-market equilibria routinely for Markovian equilibria (when they exist). When considering incomplete-market equilibria, the main di¢ culty to be overcome arises from the set of state variables. There are, of course, exogenous state variables driving the economy (for instance, output) but, in an incomplete market, there are also endogenous state variables (say, to …x ideas, "the distribution of wealth" in the population), which introduce path dependence. We write on an event tree the system of all …rst-order conditions of all times and states and solve recursively for state prices, which are dual variables. We illustrate this "dual" method and show its practical value by means of several examples.
but more complicated than, the pricing of path-dependent derivatives in which the underlying price is one state variable but there is also the state variable representing the path dependence. This is also analogous to optimum portfolio choice by dynamic programming in which wealth is an endogenous state variable. Mathematicians say that the system is "forward-backward"in time: exogenous state variables are subject to an initial condition while wealth is subject to both an initial and a terminal condition.
We address this problem by focusing on the determination of equilibrium investor-speci…c state prices.
2 As will be demonstrated below, the technique allows some amount of decoupling between time periods and states of nature. The …nal result will be a recursive construction of tomorrow's individual agents' state prices as functions of today's state prices. Wealth in this construction is not a state variable, a property which presents the major advantage that we never have to limit the positions taken by agents to guarantee that each of them has enough wealth remaining to continue trading.
That same approach has already been adopted in two previous contributions by Domenico Cuoco and Hua He. Cuoco and He (1994) propose a recursive method in continuous time. In the present paper, we prefer to stay away from continuous time for two reasons. First, the in…nite dimension of spaces opens possibilities for non existence of equilibria and for the presence of a type of "bubbles"that do not arise in a …nite-dimensional space.
3 Secondly, continuous-time models require the solution of partial di¤erential equations, approximated by means of …nite-di¤erences. These involve boundary conditions that are di¢ cult to establish a priori. Cuoco and He (2001) propose to write on a binomial tree the system of all …rst-order conditions of all times and states, and to solve this global system simultaneously. We prefer a recursive approach working by backward induction, as being less likely to go haywire numerically than a "global" approach. 4 The present paper aims to apply the Cuoco and He (1994) approach to obtain recursively the solution of the equilibrium on a tree that describes a pure-exchange economy. One side bene…t of the recursive solution method, which is of great practical importance, will be that the tree can be recombining when the exogenous variables have Markovian behavior.
The approach draws on two sets of contributions from the …eld of Mathematical Economics. Papers of the …rst set are those that demonstrated the generic existence of equilibrium in an incomplete-market stochastic …nance economy in which long-lived real assets are traded.
5 They relied on a concept variously called "pseudo-equilibrium"or "no-arbitrage equilibrium", which involved state prices as unknowns. We use a de…nition of equilibrium that is somewhat similar. The second set of papers pertains to the existence of a recursive formulation of the equilibrium when the exogenous state variables are Markovian. They discuss the choice of the endogenous state variables that permit recursivity. Kubler and Schmedders (2002) , in particular, provide examples showing that the distribution of wealth in the population, and even the equilibrium asset holdings of investors do not constitute a su¢ cient state space. Here, we shall illustrate that the distribution of individual-speci…c state prices or, equilivalently, the distribution of consumption can be used to de…ne the endogenous component of the state space. The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we write the …rst-order conditions that must prevail at each node of the tree. In Section 2, we explain how the solution of the intertemporal system can be obtained recursively. In Section 3, we exploit an homogeneity property to reduce the system of equations and we explain how the grid of points for the endogenous state variables is selected. Section 4 contains two canonical examples of the application of our method and Section 5 three additional, increasingly realistic examples. In Section 6, we discuss two problematic examples, one for which there does not exist an equilibrium at a point of the state space and one for which there does not exist a recursive equilibrium based on portfolio holdings. The …nal section concludes with some prospective developments.
1 The …rst-order conditions at a node
The economy
Time is discrete, t 2 N; from 0 to T: We start with an event tree ( ; F) where is a sample set and F a …ltration. A given information set or "node" at time t is followed by K t; nodes at time t + 1: Given any information set 2 F t , we denote by F the chain of partitions of the set that is induced by F. This chain of partitions is de…ned by F ; , f 2 F t+ ; g, = 0; 1; : : : ; T t. The unique predecessor of node is denoted . 6 The …nancial market is populated with L+1 investors indexed by l = 1; ::; L+ 1 who receive a set of exogenous time state sequences of individual endowments e t 2 R L+1 ++ ; 0 t T adapted to ( ; F) : 7 Investors may also be endowed with initial claims on each other: W 0 2 R L+1 ; P L+1 l=1 W l;0 = 0: For our purposes, it is su¢ cient for the …ltration of the event tree to be generated by the exogenous state variables e. Because the tree only involves the exogenous endowments, it can be chosen to be recombining when the endowments are Markovian, which textbook Magill and Quinzii (1996) . 6 For the standard de…nition of an event tree, see Magill-Quinzii (1996, Section 4.18 ). More detail is provided in Appendix 1. 7 Without further notice, all stochastic processes in this article are assumed to be adapted to F: is a great practical advantage compared to the global-solution approach (see Subsection 5.1 below for a comparison).
During each time period, the agents must consume some strictly positive amounts c l;t > 0 of a single perishable good, which we use as the numeraire in the economy. As in Debreu (1970 Debreu ( , 1972 and Du¢ e and Shafer (1986), we make the smooth-preference assumption, i.e., the consumption preferences of the agents are expressed in terms of the utility functions U l;t; : R ++ 7 ! R which are assumed increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly convex. The goal of agent l at time t in node 2 F t is to maximize the quantity
Rather than impose as a constraint that c l;t; > 0; we make an assumption on utility such that the agents choose strictly positive consumption, if that is at all feasible (i.e., as long as their budget set is not empty). That is an Inada assumption: lim x!0 U 0 l;t; (x) = +1: In the …nancial market, there are N 1 securities de…ned by their payo¤s or "dividends" t 2 R N ++ . The market is incomplete in the sense that N < K t; for at least some t and : In some examples, investors hold the securities long and some other investors hold them short as they are "in zero net supply". In some other examples, the securities' payo¤s may include some of the endowments, in which case we say that the securities are in positive net supply. One is just an accounting transformation of the other. We develop the equation system under the …rst instance but we remain free to present later some examples under the second instance. The prices of the securities are denoted: fS t; ;n ; 1 n N ; 0 t T ; 2 F t g : We impose: S T 0:
Any portion of the investor's wealth that is not consumed during any period t + is invested in a portfolio of securities described by the vector l;t+ ; 2 R N , 2 F t+ ; which represents the numbers of shares held. The entering wealth for period t + , not including the endowment e l;t+ ; to be received, is de…ned thus: W l;t+ ; , l;t+ 1; (S t+ ; + t+ ; ):
Investor l's budget set for the entering wealth w at time t in State is:
c l adapted to F c l;t+ ; + l;t+ ; S t+ ; = e l;t+ ; + W l;t+ ; ; = 0; : : : ; T t; 2 F ;t+ W l;t; = w
(1) When c l starting at t is in this budget set with some choice of the trading strategy l , we say that c l is a feasible consumption plan for the entering wealth W l;t; and the pair (W l;t; ; l ) is said to …nance c l . Investor l's value function for period t is, therefore, given by: 8 V l;t; (w) , sup fJ l;t; (c l ); c l 2 B (w)g ; It is veri…ed in Appendix 2, that the Principle of Dynamic Programming applies. I.e., the goal of Investor l at time t = 0 is maximized if and only if his goal at all times and in all possible states of the economy is maximized. Hence, if the consumption plan c l and the trading strategy l attain agent-l's objective, then one can claim that x = c l;t and y = l;t solve the "primal" optimization problem:
subject to : x + y S t = e l;t; + W l;t; ;
Since x > 0, i.e. consumption is strictly positive, the Lagrangian for this problem is given by L l;t; (x; y; ) = G l;t; (x; y) + (e l;t; + W l;t; x y S t ) ;
Consequently, when investor l is faced (in state 2 F t ) with entering wealth W l;t; , local price vector S t , and new endowment e l;t; , he computes his immediate consumption c l;t; , his immediate trading strategy l;t; and his local (in time and state of the economy) Arrow-Debreu shadow prices l;t; 2 R in such a way that L l;t; (c l;t; ; l;t; ; l;t; ) = inf
In particular, (c l;t; ; l;t; ; l;t; ) must satisfy the following …rst-order conditions, with the exception of the …rst one when t = T : U 0 l;t; (c l;t; ) = l;t; ; c l;t; + l;t; S t = e l;t; + W l;t; ; E t; V 0 l;t+1 [ l;t; (S t+1 + t+1 )] (S n;t+1 + n;t+1 ) = l;t; S n;t; ; 1 n N:
The dual …rst-order conditions
A straightforward application of the envelope theorem gives V 0 l;t; (W l;t; ) = l;t; (W l;t; ):
We substitute Equation (4) into (3) and show that the resulting …rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for optimality, which is the main result on which our method rests:
Theorem 1 Given a price process S and initial wealths W l;0 , the choice of consumption plans c l , trading strategies l and state prices l maximizes investor l's goal at all times and in all possible states of the economy if and only if the following three conditions, except for the …rst one when t = T , are satis…ed for any 0 t T and in any state 2 F t : U 0 l;t; (c l;t; ) = l;t; ; c l;t; + l;t; S t; = e l;t; + W l;t; ; E t; l;t+1 (S n;t+1 + n;t+1 ) = l;t; S n;t; ; 1 n N;
Furthermore, the value functions V l;t; , treated as functions of the entering wealths W l;t for period t, are concave in any state 2 F t , for any 0 t T , and, if it exists, the solution (c l ; l ) is necessarily unique.
The proof (in Appendix 3) amounts to showing by backward induction that the function V l;t; is concave.
The equilibrium
A …nancial-market equilibrium is de…ned in, e.g., Magill-Quinzii (1996) , Page 228 as a set of securities prices, portfolios and consumption allocations in the population such that the securities'markets clear:
0: The issue of the existence of a …nancial-market equilibrium in an incomplete …nancial market, when securities are long lived (which means that they are not just next-time payo¤ securities) has been the subject of several papers. 9 They have found that, under the set of assumptions that we make in the present paper, equilibrium can fail to exist in the economy described by:
; F; ; W l;0 = 0; e l ; n ; U l;t; ; 1 l L + 1; 1 n N
only at isolated points of the dataset (e l ; n ; 1 l L + 1; 1 n N ). This result was established for the case W l;0 = 0 only. 10 This is called "generic existence". Equilibrium fails to exist if it so happens that the matrix of oneperiod payo¤s inclusive of capital gains, in some state of the economy, for some value of initial wealths, fails to be of full rank N: In Section 6 below, we consider the example of an economy in which the equilibrium fails to exist at a speci…c point and we test the ability of our algorithm to …nd the equilibrium at all other points of the economy.
Many of the papers addressing the issue of existence have found it useful to utilize a concept of equilibrium called variously "pseudo-equilibrium" or "noarbitrage equilibrium" 11 and then to show that such an equilibrium is also a 9 See the references already mentioned in the introduction: Cass (1984) , Du¢ e and Shafer (1985, 1986) , Magill and Shafer (1990) , Husseini, Lasry and Magill (1990) , Hirsch, Magill and Shafer (1990) , Magill and Shafer (1991) and the textbook Magill and Quinzii (1996) . 1 0 In applications where initial claims at time 0 are not zero (but sum to zero across the population), the sizes of the claims must be below some upper bound, above which no equilibrium would exist only because a person, given his/her anticipated endowment stream, could not repay his/her initial debt.
1 1 See, for instance, Magill and Quinzii (1996) , Page 247.
…nancial-market equilibrium. In a no-arbitrage equilibrium, the unknowns are not the prices of the existing securities and the market-clearing conditions do not involve securities. Instead, they involve clearing of the goods markets, while the prices to be solved for are the state prices of one economic agent, say Agent #1. Under these state prices, Agent #1 chooses his consumption stream to maximize his goal without constraint while all other agents choose their consumption stream under the constraint that their consumption is feasible under Agent #1's state prices, given the existing set of securities. This simpli…cation re ‡ects the fact that, when all agents but one, are prevented from trading in some dimensions, then, by goods market clearing, prices will cause even the unconstrained agent to not trade in those dimensions. From the point of view of agents that are constrained, the e¤ective agent-speci…c state prices deviate from those of Agent #1 by the shadow prices of the feasiblity constraint that is imposed on them.
Our de…nition of equilibrium goes in the same direction in that it also does not include a condition of …nancial-market clearing. Instead, it includes an "aggregate-resource" restriction, Equation (7) below, which is similar to the constraint imposed on a central planner in a welfare maximization problem. However, unlike the no-arbitrage equilibrium, the unknowns are not the state prices of one agent; they are the state prices of all agents. Below, we show under the assumption that the matrix of one-period payo¤s inclusive of capital gains remains of full rank N; that securities markets clear so that our equilibrium is also a …nancial-market equilibrium.
De…nition 2 The choice of a price process S, consumption plans c l , trading strategies l and state prices l , for 1 l L + 1, is an equilibrium for the economy (6), if all conditions in (5) are satis…ed -i.e., with this choice all agents maximize their goals under the price process S at all times and in all states of the economy -and, in addition, the following aggregate resource condition holds for any 0 t T and in any state 2 F t L+1 X l=1 c l;t; = L+1 X l=1 e l;t :
Thus, in order to obtain an equilibrium, one must solve the system (5 for 1 l L + 1) and (7) -for all times and all states of the economy.
Recursivity
Now we can treat (5) and (7) as a system of conditions grouped by time periods for t = 0; 1; : : : ; T . By the beginning of period t one must be able to compute the period-t consumption levels for all agents and by the end of period t one must be able to compute the prices at which securities are to be traded. However, this cannot be achieved by solving the system period by period because the consumption c l;t; appear in the equations for period t, in which they are endogenous, and also in the equations for period (t 1) in which they are exogenous. In other words, it would be hard to solve the system recursively in the backward way because the unknowns at time t include consumptions at time t; c l;t ; whereas the third component of Equations (5) if rewritten as:
l;t+1 (c l;t+1 ) (S n;t+1 + n;t+1 ) = l;t; S n;t;
can be seen to be a restriction on consumptions at time t + 1, which at time t would already be solved for. In this form, the system is simultaneously forward and backward at each point in time. We want to re-formulate it so that it can be solved backward all the way back to time 0.
In order to make a recursive solution possible, we …rst re-cast the ‡ow-budget condition (the second condition in (5)) in terms of agent l's wealth exiting period t, which is simply F l;t , l;t S t . As the wealth entering period t is W l;t = l;t 1 (S t + t ) ; the ‡ow-budget constraint can be written equivalently as c l;t; + F l;t; = e l;t; + l;t 1;
Secondly, we introduce a crucial time-shift of equation, or regrouping, which makes the solution by backward induction possible. If we combine the …rst two equations of (5) for period t + 1 with the third equation for period t we can now associate with Period t and State the following set of conditions U 0 l;t+1; (c l;t+1; ) = l;t+1; ; 1 l L + 1; 2 F 1 c l;t+1; + F l;t+1; = e l;t+1; + l;t; (S t+1; + t+1; ); 1 l L + 1; 2 F ;1
(S n;t+1 + n;t+1 )
L+1;t+1 (S n;t+1 + n;t+1 )
For any given node 2 F t ; these conditions must hold simultaneously across its immediate successors 2 F ;1 . If we recall that (5) contains only the last two equations when t = T , it is clear that (8) exhausts all conditions de…ning equilibrium except for the last two at t = 0, which are the only "forward" conditions remaining and which we can write as:
Equation system (8) contains 2 (L + 1) K t; + L N + K t; equations in four subsets: The …rst subset provides the link between consumption and state prices. The second subset is the ‡ow budget constraint for the states of time t + 1: It could also be called "the marketability condition" because it imposes that, in this incomplete market, there exist a portfolio t chosen at time t that makes the consumption-wealth plan of time t + 1 feasible. The third subset says that all investors must agree on the prices of traded assets. We call it "the kernel condition" because it restricts the state prices l;t+1; to lie in some linear subspace. Finally, the fourth subset is the aggregate-resource constraint. The unknowns are c l;t+1; ; l;t+1; ; 1 l L + 1; 1 K t; and f l;t; ; 1 l L + 1; 1 n N g. Besides the exogenous endowments e l;t+1;j ; the "givens" are the individual state prices of time t, l;t; ; 1 l L + 1 ; which must be treated as state variables, the future securities' prices S t+1;n;j , which are obtained by the backward induction formula:
(S n;t+2 + n;t+2 ) l;t+1;
; S n;T 0; 1 n N; 1 l L+1
(10) and …nally the future investors' wealths F l;t+1;j , which are also obtained by backward induction:
(F l;t+2 + c l;t+2 e l;t+2 ) l;t+1;
; F l;T 0; 1 l L + 1
(11) where the last equation follows from (10) by dot multiplying by l;t+1; and invoking the second equation of (5).
Two interim results must be noted at this point. First, because all investors agree on traded securities (the kernel restrictions), the recursions (10) can equivalently be written on the basis of a single investor's state prices:
L+1;t+2 (S n;t+2 + n;t+2 ) L+1;t+1;
; S n;T 0; 1 n N; 1 l L+1 and the recursion (11) can equivalently be written:
(F l;t+2 + c l;t+2 e l;t+2 ) L+1;t+1;
; F l;T 0; 1 l L + 1 (12) Then, summing this last over 1 l L + 1 yields:
which, because of the aggregate resource restrictions holding at all future times t + 2; ::T; implies by backward induction:
A second result will resolve a di¢ culty with the system written so far. It contains more equations (2 (L + 1)
N . However, we can show that:
N equations of the second group of (8) are redundant.
To prove this, let us separate the states of nature = 1; ::K t; into two subsets: one subset of N states on the one hand and the remaining K t;
N on the other. Summing over l the equations of the second group of (8) written for the …rst subset of states only, we get::
(S t+1; + t+1; ); 2 a subset of N states By virtue of the aggregate-resource equations of (8), the …rst term of the lefthand side is equal to zero. Invoking (13) so is the second term. We have made all the assumptions that guarantee that an equilibrium exists generically. Under the same assumptions, there exists a choice of subset of states such that the N N matrix f(S t+1; + t+1; ); 2 a subset of N statesg is of full-rank generically. Therefore, except at most at isolated points of the dataset (W l;0 ; e l ; n ; 1 l L + 1; 1 n N ), the right-hand side implies:
12 L+1 X l=1 l;t;n = 0; 1 n N;
which means that:
Theorem 4 When the equilibrium de…ned as in De…nition 2 exists, …nancial markets clear.
If so, the second subset of equations in (8), summed over l, gives:
e l;t+1; ; 2 complement subset of K t; N states Again, however, because of the aggregate-resource equations and (13), the lefthand side sums to zero so that these are identities 0 0; which completes the abbreviated proof of Lemma 3.
In what follows, we remove the K t; N redundant equations from the set of equations (8). The most straighforward way to do that is to remove from it K t; ‡ow budget constraints, keeping only the equations written for investors 1 l L, which automatically causes the N unknowns L+1;t;n to disappear entirely from the system, since they appeared only in the equations pertaining to l = L + 1: On net, we have reduced the number of equations by K t; and the number of unknowns by N; thereby reestablishing balance.
Removing the redundant equations, we conclude that:
Theorem 5 A price process S, consumption plans c l , trading strategies l and state prices l , for 1 l L + 1 constitute an equilibrium if and only if they solve the system Consumption choice U 0 l;t+1; (c l;t+1; ) = l;t+1; ; 1 l L + 1; 2 F ;1 Flow budget constraint or "marketability" condition c l;t+1; + F l;t+1; = e l;t+1; + l;t; (S t+1; + t+1; ); 1 l L; 2 F ;1 "Kernel condition"
l;t+1 (S n;t+1 + n;t+1 )
at all t and all .
Since the equation system is linear in the portfolio choice l and since that choice is unconstrained, l can be eliminated from the equation system, reducing the number of unknowns and the number of equations by N (L + 1) :If the market were complete, N = K t; for all t and , this elimination would be su¢ cient for all ‡ow budget constraints in (15) to disappear, leading to a wellknown separation between consumption decisions and portfolio decisions. Such is not the case in an incomplete market.
A homogeneity property, a change of state variables and the interpolation strategy
The system has a useful homogeneity property involving the current values of the endogenous state variables l;t; ; 1 l L + 1. These appear only in the kernel condition and it is obvious by inspection that only the ratios l;t; = L+1;t; ; 1 l L matter and not the levels of these variables. The solution of the system is homogeneous of degree 0 in l;t; ; 1 l L + 1 : To carry out a calculation, therefore, we can use for endogenous state variables l;t;
; 1 l L or, in fact, any other one-to-one function of these ratios.
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We now choose one such function that will simplify the numerics. De…ne total endowment:
and the current share of consumption of Agent l:
; 1 l L Given the properties of marginal utility, at any given node (t; ) ;
;which is equal to
; is in a one-to-one relation with ! l;t; . Hence, we can use f! l;t; ; 1 l Lg as our endogenous state variables. In the system (15), substitute out the state prices by means of the …rst-order conditions for consumption choice and introduce the current shares of consumption:
Flow budget constraint or "marketability" condition c l;t+1; + F l;t+1; = e l;t+1; + l;t; (S t+1; + t+1; ); 1 l L; 2 F ;1 "Kernel condition"
In this …nal form, at any given current node, the solution amounts to calculating future consumptions (c l;t+1; ; 1 l L + 1; 2 F ;1 ) in each of the successor nodes for each value of the distribution of consumption at the current node (! l;t; ; 1 l L). The distribution of consumption in the population is our choice of endogenous state variable, which achieves recursivity.
The functions S n;t; and F l;t; to be carried backward are themselves homogeneous of degree 0 in l;t; ; 1 l L + 1 and can expressed as functions of the variables (! l;t; ; 1 l L) : The great numerical bene…t of this choice of variables is that all variables and function values remain bounded and continuous. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that the distribution of consumption at date t + 1 is not very far from the distribution of consumption at date t.
After the system (16) is solved at time t at node , the functions corresponding to that node are calculated point by point by the formulae: S n;t; = E t; U 0 L+1;t+1 (c L+1;t+1 ) (S n;t+1 + n;t+1 ) L+1;t;
(17)
; F l;T 0; 1 l L+1
(18) and interpolated over (0 ! l;t;
1; 1 l L). Interpolations of the functions are implemented using the Interpolation command of Mathematica. The command generates InterpolatingFunctions in which divided di¤erences are used to construct local Lagrange interpolating polynomials of order 3. Given boundedness, these work well when there are just two agents in the economy.
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InterpolatingFunctions provide approximate values that are valid over a Domain. In our codes, we take measures to extend the domain to the entire interval [0; 1]. As ! l ! 0; we estimate the limit of the functions by …tting a third-degree polynomials to the last four points of a grid of values of ! l and re…ning that grid until the estimate no longer changes.
More speci…cally, we consider the solution of the equation system of all nodes of time T 1 (at which point the equations contain zero values for F l;t+1; and S n;t+1; ). We start with an evenly spaced grid for ! l of one hundred points covering [0; 1] ; obtaining the solution of the system for each of the hundred points.
15 Then we gradually add points by successively subdividing the last two segments of the grid near the edges and solving the system again over these points, until the estimates of the limits for all nodes for all functions to be iterated remain within bounds set by a PrecisionGoal and an AccuracyGoal. When these goals are set at 10 20 ; the grid typically accumulates ten to twenty additional points above 99/100 and below 1/100. The same grid is then used repeatedly at all points in time. Once the grid is set up, calculation time is then proportional to the number of nodes. Basak-and-Cuoco (1998) 
Examples of the Basak-and-Cuoco variety
4.1 The
equilibrium
Our …rst example application is the simplest one, because it requires only the backward induction of one function F l;t; . No functions S n;t; for asset prices need to be carried backward.
We consider an economy in which there are two groups of agents.
16 Agents of Group 1 receive an endowment stream e which follows a geometric Brownian motion. We capture that endowment with a re-combining binomial tree with …xed drift and volatility as is done in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) . We set the transition probabilities at 1 2 . Agents of Group 2 receive no endowment stream but they are able to consume because they start their lives with some initial …nancial claims on Agents of Category 1:
The market is incomplete; the only traded security is an instantaneously riskless one, the rate of interest of which at time t is denoted r t . Agent j's holding of the riskless asset pays j;t at time t:
This economy is formally identical to the limited-participation economy of Basak and Cuoco (1998) , except for a small di¤erence in interpretation. In their interpretation, Group 1 is endowed with the risky security called "equity"with dividend e: Group 1 has access to both securities, whereas Group 2 has access to the riskless security only.
In their setup, however, the risky security is e¤ectively redundant since a group of identical agents (those of Group 1) are the only ones having access to it. No trading of it actually takes place at any time. In Basak and Cuoco, the security is nonetheless "held", but only because agents of Group 1 are endowed with it. 17 We can just as well consider this economy as an example of an incomplete-market economy. Basak and Cuoco (1998) calculate analytically the equilibrium market prices of risk for the special case in which Group 2 has logarithmic utility and receives no endowment. We show below the generalization by our binomial method to any pair of power utility functions. The utility function of Agent l (l = 1; 2) for time t is:
In the tradition of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) , we call = u; d (for "up" and "down") the two successor nodes of a given node of time t, with increments in e that mimick the geometric Brownian motion.
In this example, the equations system (16) particularizes to the following: 18 Flow budget constraint or "marketability" condition c 2;t+1;u + F 2;t+1;u = 2;t; ; c 2;t+1;d + F 2;t+1;d = 2;t; "Kernel condition" Aggregate-resource constraint c 1;t+1;u + c 2;t+1;u = e t+1;u ; c 1;t+1;d + c 2;t+1;d = e t+1;d where the future wealths F 2;t+1;u and F 2;t+1;d are interpolated from the recursive …nancial-wealth formula (12) for Group 2. Once the solution for f 2;t; ; c 2;t+1;u ; c 2;t+1;d g is found for a value of !; the …nancial-wealth is calculated:
(c 2;t+1;u + F 2;t+1;u )
and interpolated over ! as a preparation for the next time-step. Figure 1 , the top panel of which is analogous to Figure 2 in Basak and Cuoco (1998) , shows the price of risk or Sharpe ratio on the equity market against the time-0 distribution of consumption, 19 Group 1 having a risk aversion of 2 and Group 2 (Non Stockholders) a risk aversion of 6 and other parameters corresponding to the calibration of Mehra and Prescott (1985) as cited by Basak and Cuoco (1998) . With these risk aversions, the target empirical level of 0.4 is not easily attained. The bottom panel of the …gure shows the relationship between time-0 wealth and the time-0 distribution of consumption, which is endogenous to wealth.
For a calculation over seven periods (T = 6; t = 0; 1; 2; ::6), setting up the grid and the time-T 1 calculation require 67 seconds and the remaining periods require 64 seconds in total on the Intel Centrino dual processor of a Lenovo 3000V200 laptop computer. It would be beyond the scope of the present paper to compare for speed and e¢ cacy our algorithm with procedures proposed by previous authors. 1 8 As in (16), we have considered the equations of Agent 2 to be redundant. 1 9 S being the quoted price for equity, the market price of risk on the equity market is: 
The "reverse" Basak-Cuoco equilibrium
Our second example application is slightly more involved than the …rst one because it requires the simultaneous backward induction of both functions F and S. For purposes of illustration, we reverse the example of the previous subsection and consider an incomplete market in which there is no riskless asset available for trade. Instead, the risky equity alone, which pays = e, is available for trade. Equity has a price S. The equations system (16) for that case is:
Flow budget constraint or "marketability" condition c 2;t+1;u + F 2;t+1;u = 2;t; (e t+1;u + S t+1;u ) ; c 2;t+1;d + F 2;t+1;d = 2;t;
(e t+1;d + S t+1;d ) "Kernel condition" Aggregate-resource constraint c 1;t+1;u + c 2;t+1;u = e t+1;u ; c 1;t+1;d + c 2;t+1;d = e t+1;d where the future wealths F 2;t+1;u and F 2;t+1;d are obtained again from the interolated recursive …nancial-wealth formula for Group 2 applied at time = t+1 and the future prices of equity S t+1;u and S t+1;d are obtained from the interpolated recursive price formula (17).
As an illustration of the solution, we display in Figure 2 the Sharpe ratio (market price of risk in the equity market) as a function of Group 2's (the constrained group) share of consumption. The result is a "negative-equity premium" con…guration.
5 Other examples 5.1 Example #2 in Cuoco and He (2001) and a comment on the method
As has been mentioned in the introduction, it is possible to stack all the …rst-order conditions (16) of all the nodes into one large system, add the time-0 equations (9) and then to substitute into this system the recursions (18, 17). This huge system can conceivably be solved simultaneously in one fell swoop. We call this approach the "global method", as opposed to the recursive method, for the solution of the foward-backward system. In their paper of 2001, Cuoco and He write and solve a large system of that type. 20 In their numerical Example #6.2 (Page 289), they consider a two-period (t = 0; 1; 2; T = 2) economy with two securities: a long-term bond (maturing at time 2) and the equity claim. The node of time 0 has three spokes. At time 1, one node has two spokes and the other two have three spokes. The initial condition imposed is that the net …nancial wealth of both groups be equal to zero.
In Figure 3 , we plot the solution we obtain by the recursive method for the points of our grid that lie in a neighborhood of zero initial …nancial welath. We can read from the diagram that, at zero wealth of Group 2, the time-0 equilibrium price for the bond is 0.946, while a similar picture for the price of equity would produce the number 2.070 and for the level of consumption of Group 2 the number 1.172, exactly as in the article (Page 291).
Admittedly, the global method, when it converges to a solution, provides a single-point solution much faster than does the recursive method. It should be pointed out, however, that the recursive method delivers a whole set of points as in the …gures above. A proper horse race between the two methods is meaningful only in the case where a wide range of points is required. For instance, for this example, the global solution delivered one point in 0.89 seconds. For instance, for this example, the global solution delivered one point in 0.89 seconds. For the full grid of 127 points, 113 seconds would be required while the recursive method delivered them in 65 seconds. Of course, these comparisons are only indicative as times to get a solution are very dependent on starting values provided to the root-…nding algortihm.
For the case in which the tree is binomial, we emphasize very strongly that, even when the exogenous state variables are Markovian, the global approach does not permit the use of a recombining tree. This is because a recombining node would have a unique value of the exogenous state variables but would correspond to two di¤erent values of the endogenous state variables, depending on which node the process is coming from. This is the path-dependence aspect that we referred to in the introduction. For this reason, the recursive method works with great advantage compared to the global method. Because of the possiblity of recombination, there always exists a number of periods T such that the number of nodes T + 1 under recombination, multiplied by the number of gridpoints is less than 2 T ; thus allowing the recursive method to compute faster than the global one.
Wu' s example of buy-and-hold investors
Next, we examine an example that involves two endogenous state variables. Tao Wu (2006) has constructed an equilibrium in an economy that is similar to that of our …rst Basak-Cuoco example with the di¤erence that agents of Group 2 are no longer prevented from accessing the equity market. Instead, they access it in a mechanical way, making each period a contribution (to their pension fund) with which equity is bought and held till the last period where they consume the payo¤. The additional endogenous state variable, ; is the fraction of equity held by the people of Group 2. Parameter values are as in the Basak-Cuoco examples. The periodic contribution made by Group 2 is 12% of output. We show in Figure 4 the resulting market price of risk in the equity market (where only Group 1 trades freely and sets prices) against Group 2's share of aggregate consumption, at a time when their fraction of equity shares held is equal to 20%.
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In this example, the …nancial wealth of Group 2 and the market price of equity are interpolated in two dimensions over the two endogenous state variables. Even though equity is not traded freely between the two groups, the function giving its price as set by Group 1 is needed at each stage of the backward induction to determine, for a given amount of contribution, how many new shares Group 2 acquires. As before, we have taken great care to interpolate with precision the functions over the entire domain [0; 1] of the endogenous variable !, which we had so far. However, we have allowed extrapolations over the new endogenous state variable ; extrapolation occurs when Group 2 holds more than 100% of the equity market (with short selling by Group 1). The graphs of the functions against justify to some extent this treatment: they are practically linear in the neighborhood of = 1 and beyond. = 0:0183. The period contribution made by Group 2 is equal to 12% of output. The top line corresponds to a fraction of equity held by Group 2 that is equal to 20% and the bottom line to the optimal holdings in the completemarket situation.
The example demonstrates that the procedure can handle more than one endogenous state variable, although the computing burden is, of course, greatly increased.
The Heaton and Lucas (1996) example
For our …nal illustration, we use the lifesize application of incomplete-market theory put together by Heaton and Lucas (1996) . This is an equilibrium with two classes of agents, an incomplete market, trading costs and borrowing constraints. Here, we consider only the incomplete-market aspect. The only two assets available are the short-term (one-period) riskless security and the equity. Heaton and Lucas (1996) calculate the equilibrium numerically, by means of a tatonnement algorithm described in Lucas (1994) and based on the primal program (2) of each investor and the condition that supply equals demand in the …nancial market. The state variables are the portfolios of households. It would be di¢ cult to extend their method beyond two assets. The complexity of our approximations depends on the number L + 1 of agents and not on the number of securities N ; adding more securities to the economy only increases the number of "kernel-condition" equations in the system that must be solved at each node. 22 Their model is calibrated to match the U.S. economy, including idiosyncratic labor shocks observed on panel data. The two groups of households receive dividends in accordance with their shareholding and di¤er only in the allocation of output to their respective labor income. Otherwise, the households have identical, constant relative risk aversions 1 and discount rates . For that reason, wealth and price functions satisfy a second homogeneity property with respect to total output, in addition to the homogeneity with respect to current state prices that we pointed out in Section 3. Total output e t is only a scale variable, which can be factored out and need not be explicitly included as an exogenous state variable. That leaves three exogenous state variables that describe the exogenous aspects of the economy at any given time: (i) the realized rate of growth of output, (ii) the share of output paid out as dividend, vs. wage, (iii) the share of wage bill that is paid to Group 1, vs. Group 2. These follow an eight-state (K = 8) Markov chain, whose transition probabilities t; ;t+1; are calibrated to U.S. data. Dividends are called t+1; . Wages paid to Group l are called e l;t+1; : We introduce one endogenous state variable ! de…ned as the share of Group 1's current (time-t) consumption in current output, as in the previous examples.
Rede…ning all time-t + 1 variables to have their previous meaning excep that they refer to amounts per unit of time-t output, and calling g t; ;t+1; the gross rate of growth of total output between time t and time t+1 (which, with previous notation, would have been et+1; e t;
), the system can be written as follows:
Flow budget constraint or "marketability" condition c 2;t+1; e 2;t+1; + g t+1; F 2;t+1; = 2;t; ;1 + 2;t; ;2 (S t+1; + t+1; ); 1 8 "Kernel condition" for short-lived riskless asset
(c 2;t+1; ) 1 "Kernel condition" for equity
(c 2;t+1; )
Aggregate-resource constraint L+1 X l=1 c l;t+1; = g t+1; ; 1 8
As usual, the undiscounted …nancial wealth of Group 2 and the equity price are de…ned recursively:
(c 2;t+1; ) 1 (c 2;t+1; e 2;t+1; + g t+1; F 2; +1; ) F 2;T 0
We solve the problem over four time periods (T = 3; t = 0; 1; 2; 3). The time required is 678 second to set up the grid and calculate for one period and 400 seconds for each additional period of time.
We show in Figure 5 the equilibrium Sharpe ratios on the equity security as functions of the share of consumption of Agent 2 (1 !) in Heaton and Lucas's four "low-realized growth" states and in Figure 6 the same in the four "highrealized growth" states. Even though, in this model, dividends are positively correlated with output, the Sharpe ratios on equity can be negative. Here, the speci…cation of the behavior of state variables is such as to be able to overcome, for middle-of-the-range values of the consumption share, the e¤ect of the static risk premia, which would be positive. The e¤ect of the non-traded assets is the Figure 5: This …gure shows the Sharpe ratio on the equity security when the two groups of agents only trade the Bill and the equity, depending on the state of nature the economy is in. This …gure contains the four states of nature in which the realized growth rate is low. On the x-axis is the fraction of output consumed by Group 2. Parameter values are as in Heaton and Lucas (1996) , Table 2 , page 455. Figure 6: This …gure shows the Sharpe ratio on the equity security when the two groups of agents only trade the Bill and the equity, depending on the state of nature the economy is in. This …gure contains the four states of nature in which the realized growth rate is high. On the x-axis is the fraction of output consumed by Group 2. Parameter values are as in Heaton and Lucas (1996) , Table 2, page 455. opposite of what would be needed to solve the equity-premium puzzle. Although the Sharpe ratios are quite sizable, they are the ratios of two quantities that are very small. The equity premium is minute but so is the volatility of stock returns.
Neither the "equity-premium"nor the "excess-volatiliy"puzzle is solved by this speci…cation. That is the reason for which Heaton and Lucas claim that debt constraints and frictions are needed to match the moments observed in the data. Their message is largely the result of there being little contrast between their two groups of households.
Problematic examples and issues of existence
In this section, we discuss the ability of the algorithm to handle pathological cases. We tackle two such cases. In the …rst subsection, we process an example constructed by Magill and Quinzii (1996) 23 in which there is generic existence but existence fails at one isolated point of the dataset (W l;0 ; e l ; n ; 1 l L + 1; 1 n N ). In the second subsection, we process an example constructed by Kubler and Schmedders (2003) in which equilibrium exists but cannot be formulated as a recursive equilibrium using wealth or existing portfolios as endogenous state variables.
Non existence of equilibrium at isolated point
The example constructed by Magill and Quinzii involves a utility function that is not time separable: utility at one point in time depends on consumption at that point in time but also on consumption at the previous point in time. The example does not satisfy the set of assumptions we have made. Nonetheless, it can be processed with our algorithm because the previous period's consumption is a state variable we have introduced already for other purposes, namely as an endogenous state variable of the incomplete-market equilibrium.
In this example, time belongs to f0; 1; 2g, the event tree is:
0 ; ( 1 ; 2 ) ; 1;1 ; 1;2 ; 2;1 ; 2;2 and there are two groups of agents. The endowments e are:
(0; (1 + ; 1 ) ; (1; 1; 1; 1)) ; (0; (1 ; 1 + ) ; (1; 1; 1; 1))
The payo¤s n; on the assets are:
(0; (0; 0) ; (1; 0; 1; 0)) ; (0; (0; 0) ; (0; 1; 0; a)) ; a > 0
The utility of Group 1 is U 1 (x ) = (x ) at all nodes except at node 1;1 where it is equal to (x 1 ) (x 1;1 ) and at node 2;1 where it is equal to (x 2 ) (x 2;1 ) . The utility of Group 2 is U 2 (x ) = (x ) at time 2 and U 2 (x ) = (x ) + at time 1. The parameters satisfy > 0; > 0; + < 1; 1 1. All probabilities are set equal to 1 and utility is not discounted. Initial wealth of both groups is equal to 0.
Magill and Quinzii show that, if a 6 = 1; there exists a …nancial-market equilibriuam whereas, if a = 1; there exists > 0 such that if, 0 < j j < ; the economy has no equilibrium. Note that this non existence result applies at the point of zero initial wealth only. For all values of initial wealth not equal to 0, equilibrium exists again by virtue of the generic existence result. The equilibrium does not exist at that point because the rank of the payo¤ matrix drops at time 1. Figure 7 is one way to portray the output from our algorithm. It exhibits the prices of the two securities as functions of the initial wealth of one group. The algorithm basically ignores the point of zero initial wealth, simply because the interpolation we perform at each node implies that each point is obtained from the neighboring points. Despite the non existence of equilibrium at a speci…c point, our algorithm …nds the equilibrium at all other points of the economy. By contrast, a global solution calculated as in Subsection 5.1 with exactly zero initial wealth would have found no solution at that point. 
Conclusion
The equilibrium calculation method developed here, which is based on a dual approach to optimization, opens at least three potential avenues of research.
The …rst and most immediate application will be to use the allgorithms we have developed to answer the question we raised in the introduction. It is important to …nd out whether incomplete-market equilibria can deliver a match between model and …nancial-market data. Missing-market risks should increase risk premia and volatility and cause the distribution of wealth in the investor population to act as a dimension of risk, separate from aggregate wealth. But, what are realistic orders of magnitude of these e¤ects? We are now equipped to answer this question.
The second order of business will be to deal with equilibrium in the presence of transactions costs. In such an equilibrium, there will be periods of time during which, and states of nature in which no trade will take place and thus no price will exist. It would be, therefore, impossible to embark on a direct calculation of equilibrium by tatonnement since the form of the process for prices, being of the intermittent kind, cannot be speci…fed ab initio. Cvitanic (1997) and Jouini and Kallal (2001) have shown how the dual approach can be applied to portfolio optimization under transactions costs. It could be extended to equilibrium, 25 because the process for the dual variables can be postulated ab initio as there will exist values of these variables (analogous to bid and ask prices) at each node. As we apply the binomial tree technique and as we progressively subdivide the time interval between nodes, it will be fascinating to see the manner in which the intermittent process for asset prices approaches a continuous process.
Default risk is the third application to be considered. In a complete market, all risks being hedgable, default can occur only when an economic agent chooses not to pay what he owes and to su¤er the consequences. 26 In such a setting, agents default in states of nature in which they have received a large cash ‡ow (the "take-the-money and run"kind of default). It is clear that reality does not …t that model: people are sometimes in situations where they "cannot" pay, because they must maintain a survival level of consumption. These can occur only in incomplete markets.
In the approach we have proposed, one has to recognize one endogenous state variable for each agent in the economy (minus one, because of homogeneity of the value functions). The extension to produce an approximation valid for large populations is a very serious challenge. Krusell and Smith (1998) have provided such an approximation for the case of independent idiosyncratic risk across
Appendix 1: The event tree
There is a …nite time-horizon T > 0 and a …nite set which comprises all uncertain states of the economy. The process of revealing the true state of the economy is modeled by a tree-structure, de…ned as a …nite chain of successive partitions of the set : F = fF t ; t = 0; 1; : : : ; T g ; so that F 0 = f g, F T = ff g; 2 g and F t+1 is a subdivision of F t , 0 6 t < T , in the sense that for every 2 F t+1 there is a (necessarily unique) 2 F t , called the "predecessor" of and denoted by , which has the property . We set formally = ;. With a slight abuse of the terminology we refer to the information sets 2 F t as "states of the economy" observed during period t. The information sets 2 F t will be identi…ed with the period-t nodes on the tree in the obvious way. A random sequence or a process is any time-dependent sequence of maps f t : 7 ! E R n ; t = 0; 1; : : : ; T:
The process f is said to be consistent with (or adapted to) the tree ( ; F) if the map f t ( ) is constant on every set 2 F t , for any 0 6 t 6 T . When this property holds it makes sense to write f t ( ), 2 F t , instead of f t ( ), 2 . Given any information set 2 F t , we denote by F the chain of partitions of the set which is induced by F. This chain of partitions is de…ned by F t; ; , f 2 F t+ ; g, = 0; 1; : : : ; T t. Plainly, ( ; F ) denotes the event sub-tree (of ( ; F)) which starts from the node . We have by de…nition F 0; = f g and F ;t = F t , 0 6 t 6 T . The elements of F 1; are known as the "successors"of the node and we set F ;1 = ; for any 2 , i.e, the successors of the nodes at the last time period form an empty set. The number of immediate successors of the node 2 F t we denote by K t; , #(F ;1 ), 0 t < T . The (discrete) state-space is endowed with an objective probability measure
Since the set is …nite and any non-empty set has a strictly positive -measure, "almost everywhere" is the same as "everywhere". The space of random sequences f t+ : 7 ! E, 0 6 6 T which are de…ned on , take values in the set E R n and are adapted to the tree ( ; F ) (in the sense that f t+ is constant on every set 2 F ;t+ ) is denoted by`t( ; F ; E).
Appendix 2: The dynamic programming principle holds Theorem 6 Suppose that agent-l, 1 l L + 1, can choose a feasible consumption plan c l 2`0( ; F; R ++ ), …nanced by his initial wealth W l;0 and by his choice of a trading strategy l 2`0( ; F; R N ), so that c l attains agent-l's objective, i.e., one has V l;0 (W l;0 ) = J l;0 (c l ). Then, for any 0 < t 6 T , the consumption plan fc l;t ; c l;t+1 ; : : : ; c l;T g can be …nanced (starting from period t) by the trading strategy f l;t ; l;t+1 ; : : : ; l;T g and the entering wealth (for period t) W l;t; = l;t 1; (S t; + t; ) and one has
Proof. The very de…nition of the function V l;t; implies that for every consumption plan c l that is feasible for the entering wealth w, one must have V l;t; (w) J l;t; (c l ); c l 2 B l;t; (w) :
Suppose now that there is a consumption plan c l 2`t( ; F ; R ++ ) that is feasible for the entering wealth w = W l;t; and maximizes investor l's goal during period t < T (in state ) in the sense that V l;t; (W l;t; ) = J l;t; ( c l ):
Assuming that the trading strategy l 2`t( ; F ; R N + ) can …nance c l (together with W l;t; ), setting W l;t+1 , l;t; (S t+1 + t+1 ), and taking into account our assumption that ( ) > 0 for every 2 , it is easy to see that (20) is possible only if f c l;t+1 ; : : : ; c l;T g can be …nanced with W l;t+1 and f l;t+1 ; : : : ; l;T g, and, furthermore, V l;t+1; ( W l;t+1 ) = J l;t+1; (f c l;t+1 ; : : : ; c l;T g) ; 8 2 F ;1 :
In particular, one must have V l;t; (W l;t; ) = U l;t; ( c l;t; ) + E t; V l;t+1 ( W l;t+1 ) ; where W l;t+1 = l;t; (S t+1 + t+1 ) :
Notice that the above relations become trivial when t = T because in the last period investor l maximizes his utility only if he consumes his entire endowment and entering wealth, so that one must have c l;T = e l;T + W l;T and V l;T ( W l;t ) = U l;t ( c l;T ) U l;t (e l;T + W l;T ):
Consider next the quantities c l;t , l;t and l;t as functions of the entering wealth W l;t , which are de…ned implicitly from (3) (we assume that l;T = 0). After di¤erentiating both sides in (23) 
which is obtained by di¤erentiating both sides of the constraint c l;t (W l;t ) + l;t (W l;t ) S t = e l;t + W l;t :
For some …xed 1 l L + 1 consider the entire system of …rst order conditions (5) at all nodes 2 F t , 0 t T . It is clear from (22) that the value function V l;T ( ) is strictly concave in any state 2 , i.e., all value functions V l;T; ( ), 2 , are strictly concave. Now suppose that for some 0 t < T one can claim that the value functions V l;t+1; ( ) are strictly concave, for all possible choices of 2 F ;1 and 2 F t . Then the function R ++ R M 3 (x; y) ! G l;t (x; y) 2 R; which was de…ned in (2), also must be strictly concave in state 2 F t . Since the security prices are non-negative, (25) implies that the vector c 0 l;t (W t ); 0 l;t (W t ) 2 R 1+N ;
cannot vanish. In conjunction with the strict concavity of G l;t ( ; ), (24) and (4) imply that in state 2 F t one must have V 00 l;t (W t ) = l;t (W t ) < 0:
The fact that the value functions V l;t; ( ), 2 F t , are strictly concave for any 0 t T now follows by induction. As a result, we can claim that all functions G l;t; ( ; ) are strictly concave and that, therefore, the …rst-order conditions in (3) are both necessary and su¢ cient and, furthermore, cannot be satis…ed with more than one choice for (c l ; l ; l ), 1 l L + 1. Finally, taking into account (4), these …rst-order conditions can be written in the form (5).
Appendix 4: Detailed Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. Let N < K ;t and suppose that the ‡ow budget constraint (second set of equations in (8)) c l;t+1; + F l;t+1; = e l;t+1; + l;t; (S t+1; + t+1; ); (26) 1 l L + 1; 2 F ;1 which are linear, can be solved with respect to l;t 2 R N for every 1 l L + 1. As a linear system, equations (26) depend on l only through the right sides b l;t; , F l;t+1 + c l;t+1; e l;t+1; ; 2 F ;1 ; 1 l L + 1 :
If (26) has a solution l;t 2 R N for a …xed 1 l L + 1, the nodes in the set F ;1 (which are also the equation numbers in (26)) can be labeled 
In conjunction with the aggregate resource constraint, the relation (13) implies that at every node 2 F ;1 one must have If we now eliminate l;t , 1 l L + 1, from (8) and accordingly remove the ‡ow budget constraints, then we will be left with N L + K ;t + (K ;t N )L = K ;t (L + 1) equations for precisely the same number of unknowns: c l;t+1; , 2 F 1 , 1 l L + 1.
